Encryption plays an essential role in protecting the privacy of electronic information against threats from a variety o f p o t e n tial attackers. In so doing, modern cryptography employs a combination of conventional or symmetric cryptographic systems for encrypting data and public key or asymmetric systems for managing the keys used by the symmetric systems. Assessing the strength required of the symmetric cryptographic systems is therefore an essential step in employing cryptography for computer and communication security.
Encryption Plays an Essential Role in Protecting the Privacy of Electronic Information
1.1 There is a need for information security.
As we write this paper in late 1995, the development of electronic commerce and the Global Information Infrastructure is at a critical juncture. The dirt paths of the middle ages only became highways of business and culture after the security o f t r a velers and the merchandise they carried could be assured. So too the information superhighway will be an ill-traveled road unless information, the goods of the Information Age, can be moved, stored, bought, and sold securely. Neither corporations nor individuals will entrust their private business or personal data to computer networks unless they can assure their information's security. Today, most forms of information can be stored and processed electronically. This means a wide variety of information, with varying economic values and privacy aspects and with a wide variation in the time over which the information needs to be protected, will be found on computer networks. Consider the spectrum:
Electronic Funds Transfers of millions or even billions of dollars, whose short term security i s essential but whose exposure is brief A company's strategic corporate plans, whose con dentiality m ust be preserved for a small numb e r o f y ears A proprietary product (Coke formula, new drug design) that needs to be protected over its useful life, often decades and Information private to an individual (medical condition, employment e v aluation) that may need protection for the lifetime of the individual.
1.2 Encryption can provide strong con dentiality protection.
Encryption is accomplished by s c r a m bling data using mathematical procedures that make it extremely di cult and time consuming for anyone other than authorized recipients | those with the correct decryption keys | to recover the plain text. Proper encryption guarantees that the information will be safe even if it falls into hostile hands.
Encryption | and decryption | can be performed by either computer software or hardware. Common approaches include writing the algorithm on a disk for execution by a computer central processor placing it in ROM or PROM for execution by a microprocessor and isolating storage and execution in a computer accessory device (smart card or PCMCIA card).
The degree of protection obtained depends on several factors. These include: the quality o f t h e cryptosystem the way it is implemented in software or hardware (especially its reliability and the manner in which the keys are chosen) and the total number of possible keys that can be used to encrypt the information. A cryptographic algorithm is considered strong if:
1. There is no shortcut that allows the opponent t o r e c o ver the plain text without using brute force to test keys until the correct one is found and 2. The number of possible keys is su ciently large to make such an attack infeasible.
The principle here is similar to that of a combination lock on a safe. If the lock i s w ell designed so that a burglar cannot hear or feel its inner workings, a person who does not know the combination can open it only by dialing one set of numbers after another until it yields.
The sizes of encryption keys are measured in bits and the di culty of trying all possible keys grows exponentially with the number of bits used. Adding one bit to the key doubles the number of possible keys adding ten increases it by a factor of more than a thousand.
There is no de nitive w ay to look at a cipher and determine whether a shortcut exists. Nonetheless, several encryption algorithms | most notably the U.S Data Encryption Standard (DES) | have been extensively studied in the public literature and are widely believed to be of very high quality. A n e s s e n tial element in cryptographic algorithm design is thus the length of the key, whose size places an upper bound on the system's strength.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that there are no shortcuts and treat the length of the key as representative of the cryptosystem's workfactor | the minimum amount of e ort required to break the system. It is important to bear in mind, however, that cryptographers regard this as a rash assumption and many w ould recommend keys two or more times as long as needed to resist brute-force attacks. Prudent cryptographic designs not only employ l o n g e r k e y s t h a n m i g h t appear to be needed, but devote more computation to encrypting and decrypting. A good example of this is the popular approach of using triple-DES: encrypting the output of DES twice more, using a total of three distinct keys.
Encryption systems fall into two broad classes. Conventional or symmetric cryptosystems | those in which a n e n tity with the ability to encrypt also has the ability to decrypt and vice versa | are the systems under consideration in this paper. The more recent public key or asymmetric cryptosystems have the property that the ability to encrypt does not imply the ability to decrypt. In contemporary cryptography, public-key systems are indispensable for managing the keys of conventional cryptosystems. All known public key cryptosystems, however, are subject to shortcut attacks and must therefore use keys ten or more times the lengths of those discussed here to achieve the an equivalent l e v el of security.
Although computers permit electronic information to be encrypted using very large keys, advances in computing power keep pushing up the size of keys that can be considered large and thus keep making it easier for individuals and organizations to attack encrypted information without the expenditure of unreasonable resources.
1.3 There are threats from a variety of potential attackers.
Threats to con dentiality of information come from a number of directions and their forms depend on the resources of the attackers.`Hackers,' who might b e a n ything from high school students to commercial programmers, may h a ve access to mainframe computers or networks of workstations. The same people can readily buy inexpensive, o -the-shelf, boards, containing Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) chips that function as`programmable hardware' and vastly increase the effectiveness of a cryptanalytic e ort. A startup company o r e v en a well-heeled individual could a ord large numbers of these chips. A major corporation or organized crime operation with`serious money' to spend could acquire custom computer chips specially designed for decryption. An intelligence agency, engaged in espionage for national economic advantage, could build a machine employing millions of such c hips.
1.4 Current t e c hnology permits very strong encryption for e ectively the same cost as weaker encryption.
It is a property of computer encryption that modest increases in computational cost can produce vast increases in security. Encrypting information very securely (e.g., with 128-bit keys) typically requires little more computing than encrypting it weakly (e.g., with 40-bit keys). In many applications, the cryptography itself accounts for only a small fraction of the computing costs, compared to such processes as voice or image compression required to prepare material for encryption. One consequence of this uniformity of costs is that there is rarely any need to tailor the strength of cryptography to the sensitivity of the information being protected. Even if most of the information in a system has neither privacy implications nor monetary value, there is no practical or economic reason to design computer hardwa r e o r s o f t ware to provide di ering levels of encryption for di erent messages. It is simplest, most prudent, and thus fundamentally most economical, to employ a uniformly high level of encryption: the strongest encryption required for any information that might be stored or transmitted by a secure system.
Readily Available Technology Makes Brute-Force Decryption Attacks Faster and Cheaper
The kind of hardware used to mount a brute-force attack against an encryption algorithm depends on the scale of the cryptanalytic operation and the total funds available to the attacking enterprise.
In the analysis that follows, we consider three general classes of technology that are likely to be employed by attackers with di ering resources available to them. Not surprisingly, the cryptanalytic technologies that require larger up-front i n vestments yield the lowest cost per recovered key, amortized over the life of the hardware. It is the nature of brute-force attacks that they can be parallelized inde nitely. It is possible to use as many machines as are available, assigning each t o w ork on a separate part of the problem. Thus regardless of the technology employed, the search time can be reduced by adding more equipment twice as much h a r d w are can be expected to nd the right k ey in half the time. The total investment will have doubled, but if the hardware is kept constantly busy nding keys, the cost per key recovered is unchanged.
At the low end of the technology spectrum is the use of conventional personal computers or workstations programmed to test keys. Many people, by virtue of already owning or having access to the machines, are in a position use such resources at little or no cost. However, general purpose computers | laden with such ancillary equipment as video controllers, keyboards, interfaces, memory, and disk storage | make expensive search engines. They are therefore likely to be employed only by casual attackers who are unable or unwilling to invest in more specialized equipment.
A more e cient t e c hnological approach i s t o t a k e a d v antage of commercially available Field Programmable Gate Arrays. FPGAs function as programmable hardware and allow faster implementations of such tasks as encryption and decryption than conventional processors. FPGAs are a commonly used tool for simple computations that need to be done very quickly, particularly simulating integrated circuits during development.
FPGA technology is fast and cheap. The cost of an AT&T ORCA chip that can test 30 million DES keys per second is $200. This is 1,000 times faster than a PC at about one-tenth the cost! FPGAs are widely available and, mounted on cards, can be installed in standard PCs just like sound cards, modems, or extra memory.
FPGA technology may be optimal when the same tool must be used for attacking a variety of di erent cryptosystems. Often, as with DES, a cryptosystem is su ciently widely used to justify the construction of more specialized facilities. In these circumstances, the most cost-e ective technology, but the one requiring the largest initial investment, is the use of Application-Speci c Integrated C i r cuits (ASICs). A $ 1 0 c hip can test 200 million keys per second. This is seven times faster than an FPGA chip at one-twentieth the cost.
Because ASICs require a far greater engineering investment than FPGAs and must be fabricated in quantity before they are economical, this approach is only available to serious, well-funded operations such as dedicated commercial (or criminal) enterprises and government i n telligence agencies.
3 40-Bit Key Lengths O er Virtually No Protection Current U.S. Government policy generally limits exportable mass market software that incorporates encryption for con dentiality to using the RC2 or RC4 algorithms with 40-bit keys. A 40-bit key length means that there are 2 40 possible keys. On average, half of these (2 39 ) m ust be tried to nd the correct one. Export of other algorithms and key lengths must be approved on a case by case basis. For example, DES with a 56-bit key has been approved for certain applications such a s nancial transactions. The recent successful brute-force attack b y t wo F rench graduate students on Netscape's 40-bit RC4 algorithm demonstrates the dangers of such short keys. These students at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris used`idle time' on the school's computers, incurring no cost to themselves or their school. Even with these limited resources, they were able to recover the 40-bit key in a few days.
There is no need to have the resources of an institution of higher education at hand, however. Anyone with a modicum of computer expertise and a few hundred dollars would be able to attack 40-bit encryption much faster. An FPGA chip | costing approximately $400 mounted on a card | w ould on average recover a 40-bit key in ve hours. Assuming the FPGA lasts three years and is used continuously to nd keys, the average cost per key is eight cents.
A more determined commercial predator, prepared to spend $10,000 for a set-up with 25 ORCA chips, can nd 40-bit ke y s i n a n a verage of 12 minutes, at the same average eight c e n t cost. Spending more money to buy more chips reduces the time accordingly: $300,000 results in a solution in an average of 24 seconds $10,000,000 results in an average solution in 0.7 seconds.
As already noted, a corporation with substantial resources can design and commission custom chips that are much faster. By doing this, a company spending $300,000 could nd the right 40-bit key in an average of 0.18 seconds at 1/10th of a cent per solution a larger company o r g o vernment agency willing to spend $10,000,000 could nd the right k ey on average in 0.005 seconds (again at 1/10th of a cent per solution). (Note that the cost per solution remains constant because we have conservatively assumed constant costs for chip acquisition | in fact increasing the quantities purchased of a custom chip reduces the average chip cost as the initial design and set-up costs are spread over a greater numb e r o f c hips.)
These results are summarized in Table I. 4 Even DES with 56-Bit Keys Is Increasingly Inadequate 4.1 DES is no panacea today.
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was developed in the 1970s by IBM and NSA and adopted by the U.S. Government a s a F ederal Information Processing Standard for data encryption. It was intended to provide strong encryption for the government's sensitive but unclassi ed information. It was recognized by many, e v en at the time DES was adopted, that technological developments would make DES's 56-bit key exceedingly vulnerable to attack before the end of the century. Today, DES may be the most widely employed encryption algorithm and continues to be a commonly cited benchmark. Yet DES-like encryption strength is no panacea. Calculations show that DES is inadequate against a corporate or government a t t a c ker committing serious resources. The bottom line is that DES is cheaper and easier to break than many believe.
As explained above, 40-bit encryption provides inadequate protection against even the most casual of intruders, content t o s c a venge time on idle machines or to spend a few hundred dollars. Against such opponents, using DES with a 56-bit key will provide a substantial measure of security. At present, it would take a y ear and a half for someone using $10,000 worth of FPGA technology to search out a DES key. In ten years time an investment of this size would allow one to nd a DES key in less than a week.
The real threat to commercial transactions and to privacy on the Internet is from individuals and organizations willing to invest substantial time and money. As more and more business and personal information becomes electronic, the potential rewards to a dedicated commercial predator also increase signi cantly and may justify the commitment of adequate resources.
A serious e ort | on the order of $300,000 | by a legitimate or illegitimate business could nd a DES key in an average of 19 days using o -the-shelf technology and in only 3 hours using a custom developed chip. In the latter case, it would cost $38 to nd each k ey (again assuming a 3 year life to the chip and continual use). A business or government willing to spend $10,000,000 on custom chips, could recover DES ke y s i n a n a verage of 6 minutes, for the same $38 per key.
At t h e v ery high end, an organization | presumably a government i n telligence agency | willing to spend $300,000,000 could recover DES keys in 12 seconds each! The investment required is large but not unheard of in the intelligence community. It is less than the cost of the Glomar Explorer, built to salvage a single Russian submarine, and far less than the cost of many s p y satellites. Such an expense might be hard to justify in attacking a single target, but seems entirely appropriate against a cryptographic algorithm, like DES, enjoying extensive popularity around the world.
There is ample evidence of the danger presented by g o vernment i n telligence agencies seeking to obtain information not only for military purposes but for commercial advantage. Congressional hearings in 1993 highlighted instances in which the French and Japanese governments spied on behalf of their countries' own businesses. Thus, having to protect commercial information against such threats is not a hypothetical proposition.
4.2 There are smarter avenues of attack than brute force.
It is easier to walk around a tree than climb up and down it. There is no need to break the window of a house to get in if the front d o o r i s u n l o c ked.
Calculations regarding the strength of encryption against brute-force attack a r e worst case scenarios. They assume that the ciphers are in a sense perfect and that attempts to nd shortcuts have failed. One important p o i n t is that the crudest approach | searching through the ke y s | i s entirely feasible against many widely used systems. Another is that the keylengths we discuss are always minimal. As discussed earlier, prudent designs might u s e k eys twice or three times as long to provide a margin of safety.
4.3 The analysis for other algorithms is roughly comparable.
The above analysis has focused on the time and money required to nd a key to decrypt information using the RC4 algorithm with a 40-bit key or the DES algorithm with its 56-bit key, but the results are not peculiar to these ciphers. Although each algorithm has its own particular characteristics, the e ort required to nd the keys of other ciphers is comparable. There may be some di erences as the result of implementation procedures, but these do not materially a ect the brute-force breakability of algorithms with roughly comparable key lengths.
Speci cally, it has been suggested at times that di erences in set-up procedures, such as the long key-setup process in RC4, result in some algorithms having e ectively longer keys than others. For the purpose of our analysis, such factors appear to vary the e ective k ey length by n o m o r e than about eight bits.
5 Appropriate Key Lengths for the Future | A Proposal Table I summarizes the costs of carrying out brute-force attacks against symmetric cryptosystems with 40-bit and 56-bit keys using networks of general purpose computers, Field Programmable Gate Arrays, and special-purpose chips.
It shows that 56 bits provides a level of protection | about a year and a half | that would be adequate for many commercial purposes against an opponent p r e p a r e d t o i n vest $10,000. Against an opponent prepared to invest $300,000, the period of protection has dropped to the barest minimum of 19 days. Above this, the protection quickly declines to negligible. A v ery large, but easily imaginable, investment b y a n i n telligence agency would clearly allow i t t o r e c o ver keys in real time.
What workfactor would be required for security t o d a y? For an opponent whose budget lay in the $10 to 300 million range, the time required to search out keys in a 75-bit keyspace would be between 6 years and 70 days. Although the latter gure may seem comparable to the`barest minimum' 19 days mentioned earlier, it represents | under our amortization assumptions | a cost of $19 million and a recovery rate of only ve k e y s a y ear. The victims of such an attack w ould have to be fat targets indeed.
Because many kinds of information must be kept con dential for long periods of time, assessment cannot be limited to the protection required today. Equally important, cryptosystems | especially if they are standards | often remain in use for years or even decades. DES, for example, has been in use for more than 20 years and will probably continue to be employed for several more. In particular, the lifetime of a cryptosystem is likely to exceed the lifetime of any individual product embodying it.
A rough estimate of the minimum strength required as a function of time can be obtained by applying an empirical rule, popularly called`Moore's Law,' which holds that the computing power available for a given cost doubles every 18 months. Taking into account both the lifetime of cryptographic equipment and the lifetime of the secrets it protects, we believe it is prudent t o require that encrypted data should still be secure in 20 years. Moore's Law t h us predicts that the keys should be approximately 14 bits longer than required to protect against an attack t o d a y.
Bearing in mind that the additional computational costs of stronger encryption are modest, we strongly recommend a minimum key-length of 90 bits for symmetric cryptosystems.
It is instructive to compare this recommendation with both Federal Information Processing Standard 46, The Data Encryption Standard (DES), and Federal Information Processing Standard 185, The Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES). DES was proposed 21 years ago and used a 56-bit key. Applying Moore's Law and adding 14 bits, we see that the strength of DES when it was proposed in 1975 was comparable to that of a 70-bit system today. F urthermore, it was estimated at the time that DES was not strong enough and that keys could be recovered at a rate of one per day for an investment o f a b o u t t wenty-million dollars. Our 75-bit estimate today corresponds to 61 bits in 1975, enough to have m o ved the cost of key recovery just out of reach. The Escrowed Encryption Standard, while unacceptable to many potential users for other reasons, embodies a notion of appropriate key length that is similar to our own. It uses 80-bit ke y s , a n umber that lies between our gures of 75 and 90 bits. Whit eld Di e is a distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems specializing in security.
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